


Our Case Number: ABP-314724-22



**An
Bord
Pleanála**

Cormac Rabbitt
8 Hy Brasail Court
Circular Road
Co. Galway

Date: 04 April 2025

Re: Railway (Metrolink - Estuary to Charlemont via Dublin Airport) Order [2022]
Metrolink. Estuary through Swords, Dublin Airport, Ballymun, Glasnevin and City Centre to
Charlemont, Co. Dublin

Dear Sir / Madam,


An Bord Pleanála has received your recent submission in relation to the above-mentioned proposed railway order and will take it into consideration in its determination of the matter.

The Board will revert to you in due course with regard to the matter.

If you have any queries in the meantime, please contact the undersigned officer of the Board at laps@pleanala.ie.

Please quote the above mentioned An Bord Pleanála reference number in any correspondence or telephone contact with the Board.

Yours faithfully,


Eimear Reilly
Executive Officer
Direct Line: 01-8737184

RA05

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To the Members of An Bord Pleanála

**Re: Railway (MetroLink - Estuary to Charlemont via Dublin Airport) Order [2022]
MetroLink. Estuary through Swords, Dublin Airport, Ballymun, Glasnevin and
City Centre to Charlemont, Co. Dublin – ABP Letter 28th February 2025**

Submission Unlawful Exclusion of Metro Dublin from Statutory Planning Processes

Cormac Rabbitt CM
Jed van de Pol CEO
Trading as Metro Dublin
March 27th, 2025

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 - D. Submission to An Bord Pleanála Unlawful Exclusion of Metro Dublin from Statutory Planning Processes**
-

A

Statement of Compliance with An Bord Pleanála's Submission Requirements

In accordance with the instructions provided by An Bord Pleanála in the letter dated 28 February 2025 regarding the MetroLink - Estuary to Charlemont via Dublin Airport Order [2022], I hereby submit our detailed response to address the specific concerns raised by An Bord Pleanála.

Compliance with Submission Instructions:

1. **Relevance to the Railway Order Application:** This submission strictly pertains to the issues and documentation specified by An Bord Pleanála, relating to the MetroLink project as detailed in the Railway Order application. It focuses on the response to the Wild Ireland Defence, PFAS management strategies at Dublin Airport, updates to cumulative impact assessments, and the oral hearing preparation.
2. **Inclusion of Required Information:**
 - **Case Reference Number:** ABP-314724-22
 - **Submitter By:** Cormac Rabbitt, Trading as Metro Dublin
 - **Representation Details:** This submission is prepared and submitted by myself, Cormac Rabbitt, in my capacity as the representative of Metro Dublin.

Purpose of Submission: This document aims to provide comprehensive information and clarification to ensure a thorough understanding by An Bord Pleanála of our position and the relevant environmental and regulatory compliance issues associated with the MetroLink project. It is designed to directly address the components listed by An Bord Pleanála, ensuring that all responses are precise, factual, and strictly relevant to the matters raised.

Conclusion: We trust that this submission meets the requirements set forth by An Bord Pleanála and aids in the accurate and fair evaluation of the MetroLink project. We remain committed to transparent and constructive communication with An Bord Pleanála and are prepared to provide any additional information required to assist the Board in its decision-making process.

Thank you for your attention to this submission. I look forward to the opportunity to further discuss the contents at the upcoming oral hearing or as may be deemed necessary by the Board.

Detailed Compliance with An Bord Pleanála Submission Requirements

This compliance supplements the main submission by providing detailed evidence of compliance with the statutory, regulatory, and procedural guidelines specified by An Bord Pleanála for the Metro Dublin project. It outlines the comprehensive legal and environmental assessments undertaken and demonstrates adherence to best practices in public infrastructure development.

1. Legal and Statutory Framework:

- **Strategic Infrastructure Development (SID) Compliance:** Metro Dublin has engaged in pre-application consultations with ABP since 2015, confirming its status as a bona fide infrastructure proposal under the Planning and Development Act 2000.
- **EU and Irish Competition Law:** The project aligns with EU directives on railway market liberalization and Irish competition laws that prohibit the exclusion of eligible private transport projects from statutory processes, ensuring fair competition in rail infrastructure development.

2. Adherence to Railway Infrastructure and Planning Laws:

- **Railway Order Requirements:** The submission adheres to the requirements of the Transport (Railway Infrastructure) Act 2001, detailing the necessary steps for obtaining a railway order and highlighting the absence of legal impediments to Metro Dublin's consideration.
- **Planning Law Obligations:** Metro Dublin's inclusion in regional transport plans is advocated, aligning with statutory duties under the Dublin Transport Authority Act 2008 and supporting an integrated transport network as envisioned by the NTA and TII.

4. Public Consultation and Stakeholder Engagement:

- **Transparency and Engagement:** The project has undertaken extensive public consultations, involving the Government Cabinet Committee on Infrastructure and PPPs, the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Transport, Dublin City Council's Strategic Policy Committees for Planning and Transport and Local Area Committees, the Ashbourne community ABP (**Case REF 06F. NC0013 - Proposed Metro Dublin Development**), and numerous conferences in Ireland and abroad, ensuring transparency and community involvement in line with the Public Consultation Guidelines issued by An Bord Pleanála.
 - **Stakeholder Feedback Incorporation:** Responses to public and stakeholder input are incorporated into Metro Dublin, demonstrating how community feedback has influenced project modifications and enhancements.
-

5. Compliance with ABP Specific Directives:

- **Response to ABP Inquiries:** All specific inquiries raised by An Bord Pleanála, except those involving engagement with the NTA and TII, who refused to engage with Metro Dublin, have been addressed. Numerous concerns of ABP are addressed in the submission, providing detailed responses and justifications for the project's approach and methodologies.
- **Documentation and Evidence Submission:** Relevant project impact assessments and legal justifications are included, ensuring that the submission is comprehensive and meets all requirements specified by An Bord Pleanála for case reference No: ABP-314724-22.

Conclusion:

This supplement supports the main submission to An Bord Pleanála by providing detailed documentation of Metro Dublin's compliance with legal, environmental, and procedural standards. It affirms the project's commitment to adhering to the highest standards of public infrastructure development and demonstrates the readiness of Metro Dublin to fulfill the transport needs of Dublin's future sustainably and responsibly.

B

Overview of Legal and Statutory Analysis of Metro Dublin's Exclusion from Planning Processes

Introduction:

Metro Dublin (ABP Case REF 06F. NC0013) represents a transformative vision for the future of Dublin's transport network. It promises to enhance connectivity, increase economic productivity, and provide sustainable transport solutions. Despite its potential, Metro Dublin has been excluded from the statutory planning and Railway Order process by the National Development Authority (NTA) and Transport Infrastructure Ireland (TII). This exclusion not only undermines the efficacy of Dublin's transport planning but also contravenes established Irish and EU laws pertaining to fair competition and infrastructure development.

Legal and Statutory Framework:

Metro Dublin has meticulously complied with all legal and procedural prerequisites to qualify as a Strategic Infrastructure Development (SID). Since formally entering pre-application consultations with An Bord Pleanála in 2015, it has become evident that the project fulfills every criterion necessary for thoughtful consideration within Ireland's planning framework.

Competition and Railway Infrastructure Law:

The exclusion of Metro Dublin from consideration violates the EU's directives on railway market liberalisation, which advocate for open competition in rail infrastructure development. Both EU and Irish competition laws mandate that eligible private transport projects cannot be arbitrarily excluded from statutory processes, ensuring a level playing field for all viable projects.

Planning and Development Law Obligations:

Metro Dublin has undertaken comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) and Natura Impact Statements (NIS), aligning with the Planning and Development Act 2000. The failure to include Metro Dublin in various impact assessments and developmental plans represents a significant oversight and breach of planning law.

NTA and TII Statutory Duties:

By excluding Metro Dublin, the NTA and TII have failed to adhere to their statutory duties to develop a comprehensive and integrated transport network. This exclusion not only limits the scope of Dublin's transport infrastructure but also denies the public the benefits of a potentially superior transport solution.

Conclusion and Requests:

This submission urges An Bord Pleanála to recognize the issues presented and to ensure a fair, legal, and comprehensive assessment of Metro Dublin alongside other projects. We

request that An Bord Pleanála exercise its authority to rectify the exclusion of Metro Dublin from the statutory planning process, facilitating a more inclusive and equitable consideration of transport solutions that truly meet the needs of Dublin's citizenry.

We believe that Metro Dublin, with its high-capacity, high-efficiency offerings, is not just a viable alternative but a necessary component of Dublin's future transport infrastructure. It promises to alleviate congestion, enhance connectivity, and significantly improve the daily commutes of thousands of Dubliners.

We trust that An Bord Pleanála will give due consideration to this submission (see attached) and act judiciously to uphold the principles of fairness, legality, and comprehensive urban planning.

C

Overview of Metro Dublin Challenging Unlawful Exclusion from Planning Processes

Introduction

Context: Introduces Metro Dublin as a strategic development designed to enhance Dublin's transport network and complement existing planned or proposed developments like MetroLink.

Issue: Highlights the unlawful exclusion of Metro Dublin from the statutory planning and Railway Order process by National Development Authority (NTA) and Transport Infrastructure Ireland (TII).

Objective: Aims to demonstrate that such exclusion violates Irish planning law, transport infrastructure statutes, and both Irish and EU law.

1. Legal and Statutory Framework

Compliance: Details Metro Dublin's compliance with all legal and procedural requirements necessary to be considered a Strategic Infrastructure Development (SID).

Pre-application Consultation: Notes that Metro Dublin has formally entered pre-application consultations with ABP since 2015.

2. Competition and Railway Infrastructure Law

EU and Irish Law Violations: Argues that the exclusion of Metro Dublin from statutory processes is prohibited under both EU and Irish law, which mandate open competition in rail infrastructure development.

3. Planning and Development Law Obligations

Environmental Impact Assessments: Discusses Metro Dublin's preliminary Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Natura Impact Statement (NIS) screenings.

Obligations and Breaches: Suggests that the failure to include Metro Dublin in various assessments represents a breach of planning and development law obligations.

4. NTA and TII Statutory Duties

Mandate Violations: Claims that by excluding Metro Dublin, NTA and TII have not adhered to their statutory duties to develop a comprehensive and integrated transport network.

5. Conclusion and Requests

Appeal to An Bord Pleanála: Urges ABP to acknowledge the issues raised and to ensure a fair, legal, and comprehensive assessment of Metro Dublin alongside other projects.

D

Submission to An Bord Pleanála

Unlawful Exclusion of Metro Dublin from Statutory Planning Processes

Introduction

Metro Dublin is a privately promoted strategic metro development designed to dramatically improve Dublin's transport network. It offers a comprehensive, high-capacity rail solution that complements the state-sponsored MetroLink and addresses critical gaps in the Greater Dublin Area (GDA) transport system. Despite Metro Dublin's proven merits and its compliance with all legal and procedural requirements, it has been systematically and unlawfully excluded from consideration in the ongoing statutory planning and Railway Order process by the National Development Authority (NTA) and the Transport Infrastructure Ireland (TII). This submission, on behalf of Metro Dublin, details how such exclusion violates Irish planning law, transport infrastructure statutes, the mandates of the NTA and the TII, as well as Irish and EU competition law. We provide evidence from the applicant's own documents – the *"Update to the Cumulative Impact Assessment Report"* and *"Appendix A9.2M Traffic and Transportation Assessment – St. Stephen's Green Station"* – alongside relevant plans and expert analyses, to demonstrate that Metro Dublin delivers essential network-level benefits (congestion relief, capacity, coverage, value for money) that have been ignored without lawful justification. We respectfully urge An Bord Pleanála (ABP) to acknowledge these issues and exercise its authority to ensure a fair, legal, and comprehensive assessment of Metro Dublin as an alternative and complementary project.

1. Legal and Statutory Framework: Metro Dublin's Right to be Considered

Metro Dublin's promoters have diligently followed all statutory procedures to have the project assessed as a Strategic Infrastructure Development (SID) under the Planning and Development Act 2000. The project has formally entered pre-application consultation with ABP in 2015, meaning it is officially recognized as a bona fide infrastructure proposal under Irish planning law.

- Metro Dublin has prepared preliminary Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Natura Impact Statement (NIS) screenings and engaged with the Board and other stakeholders, including the Government Committee on Infrastructure and PPPs, Oireachtas Committee on Transport, Local Authority Planning and Transport Strategic Policy Committees establishing that it is a serious proposal advancing through proper legal channels.
 - In short, Metro Dublin meets every **statutory requirement** to be considered in the planning process.
-

1.1 Competition and Railway Infrastructure Law

Both EU and Irish law explicitly prohibit the exclusion of eligible private transport projects from statutory processes on arbitrary or anti-competitive grounds. The European Union's railway market liberalisation directives mandate open competition in rail infrastructure development. Under EU law, the Irish State **"cannot exclude Metro Dublin from the planning process if it meets statutory requirements."**

The EU's Fourth Railway Package (EU Regulation 2016/796) enshrines market access rights for private infrastructure developers, reinforcing that projects like Metro Dublin must be allowed to compete on equal footing

In addition, Irish and EU competition law ensure that Metro Dublin is entitled to seek planning approval and financing just as any state-sponsored project would

By sidelining Metro Dublin, state agencies are acting in conflict with these legal principles. The Transport (Railway Infrastructure) Act 2001 – which established the framework for delivering railway projects – was intended to facilitate **additional rail infrastructure investment**, including through public-private partnerships. Nothing in that Act or related legislation empowers any authority to suppress a qualifying rail project that could serve the public interest. On the contrary, the Act (as well as the subsequent establishment of TII) emphasizes expeditious development of rail infrastructure for the benefit of the public. A decision to **exclude** Metro Dublin from consideration effectively grants MetroLink a monopoly and denies the traveling public the benefits of competition. This raises serious questions under the Irish Competition Act 2002 (as amended) and Articles 102 and 106 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, as it amounts to a public body abusing its dominant position by preventing a potential competitor from entering the market. In summary, the exclusion of Metro Dublin violates the spirit and letter of competition and railway law intended to encourage multiple initiatives for much-needed infrastructure.

1.2 Planning and Development Law Obligations

The Planning and Development Act 2000 (as amended) and associated regulations impose clear duties on both developers and consent authorities to consider **reasonable alternatives** and the cumulative effects of other planned projects. As a SID proponent, Metro Dublin is entitled to a fair and objective assessment alongside other options. The law requires that an Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIAR) include "an outline of the main alternatives studied by the applicant...and an indication of the main reasons for choosing the selected option" (EIA Directive 2014/52/EU, transposed in Schedule 6 of the Planning and Development Regulations). The MetroLink EIAR and planning application should therefore have acknowledged **alternative transport solutions** capable of meeting similar needs – including the Metro Dublin network – especially given Metro Dublin's advanced planning status. Failure to do so represents a breach of these EIA obligations.

Moreover, when assessing cumulative impacts, a developer must account for "other existing or approved projects" so that the Board can evaluate the full environmental effect of the proposal in context. Metro Dublin, having entered pre-planning with ABP, is indisputably an "other project" in the planning pipeline and should have been considered

in the cumulative impact analysis. As detailed in Section 30.2.1 of the applicant's *Update to the Cumulative Impact Assessment Report*, the methodology called for identifying **major developments (including SIDs) within 15 km** of MetroLink that could interact cumulatively. Indeed, the applicant ostensibly compiled a long-list of such developments using the ABP website and the NTA's Transport Strategy for the GDA 2022–2042. Metro Dublin falls squarely within this category: it is a large-scale SID in pre-planning, within the Dublin region. **Omitting Metro Dublin from that list** – or excluding it in subsequent shortlisting – has no valid basis in planning law. It suggests a predetermined intent to ignore this project regardless of its relevance, undermining the integrity of the EIA process.

1.3 NTA and TII Statutory Duties

The National Transport Authority and Transport Infrastructure Ireland, as public bodies, have statutory mandates that do not allow arbitrary dismissal of viable transport projects. Under the Dublin Transport Authority Act 2008 (which established the NTA), the Authority is charged with developing an integrated, comprehensive transport network in line with policy, objectives and the needs of the public. The NTA's **Transport Strategy for the GDA 2022–2042** is a statutory plan, but it is not infallible nor exclusive; it can and must be reviewed to include new solutions when they are appropriate. By rigidly adhering only to projects already in the current Strategy (and National Development Plan) and treating that list as closed, NTA and TII effectively foreclosed consideration of Metro Dublin, even though the All-Island Strategic Rail Review explicitly noted that additional interventions beyond MetroLink could be considered in future plans. The *Update to the Cumulative Impact Assessment Report* makes clear that the applicant chose to **exclude any project not already adopted as policy**, stating that recommendations from new studies (the Rail Review in that case) were “not appropriate to consider...as part of the cumulative impact assessment” because they are not yet policy. This logic is circular and legally flawed – it allows the NTA's own omission of Metro Dublin from its 2022 Strategy to serve as a self-justifying excuse to ignore Metro Dublin in all further analyses. NTA's statutory obligation to plan for the region's transport needs cannot be met if it refuses to evaluate a project with **“the potential for cumulative impact”** just because it wasn't originated by NTA.

Similarly, TII (and formerly the Railway Procurement Agency) was established to deliver transport infrastructure in the public interest. It has no legal authority to act as a gatekeeper barring privately-financed proposals that meet statutory criteria. To the extent TII is the applicant for MetroLink, it was incumbent on TII to disclose and assess interactions with Metro Dublin – for example, how MetroLink's design at St. Stephen's Green might affect a future intersecting metro line, or vice versa. The failure to do so not only breaches EIA requirements but also TII's duty of **impartiality** in facilitating transport investment. TII's enabling legislation (Roads Act 2015, merging the Railway Procurement Agency (RPA) into TII) did not confer it a monopoly on metro development; yet by ignoring Metro Dublin, TII acted as though only state-sponsored projects deserve consideration. This represents a misuse of TII's statutory powers and a neglect of its responsibility to serve the public interest by embracing, not excluding, complementary solutions.

Evidence of Metro Dublin's Exclusion from the Planning Process

The exclusion of Metro Dublin is clearly documented by the applicant's own submissions and the approach taken in the MetroLink Railway Order application. We draw the Board's attention to the following specific omissions and decision points which cumulatively demonstrate a **systematic sidelining** of Metro Dublin:

- **No Consideration in Alternatives Analysis:** The MetroLink application and EIAR do not mention Metro Dublin in the context of alternatives considered. Despite Metro Dublin being a readily identifiable alternative (or addition) to improve airport and city centre connectivity, the applicant treated the project as if it did not exist. Alternatives were likely confined to minor route or technology variations of MetroLink itself, rather than evaluating a fundamentally different approach such as a **wider metro network** or private-sector delivery. This is a significant lapse in the context of the Board's obligation to consider whether the chosen project is the optimal solution.
 - **Cumulative Impact Assessment Omissions:** As noted, the *Update to the Cumulative Impact Assessment Report* – submitted post-Oral Hearing – reveals the criteria and shortlist of other projects considered for cumulative effects. Metro Dublin is absent. The methodology initially stated that **"any other major developments...in pre-planning...with the potential for cumulative impact"** would be identified. In practice, however, the applicant appears to have **screened out Metro Dublin**, likely on the subjective grounds that it is not an "official" project. The report makes a blanket statement that only projects constituting policy commitments or with sufficient certainty were considered, explicitly **excluding proposals that were not yet adopted in a plan**. This exclusion was not based on any transparent technical criterion (e.g. timing conflict or de minimis impact); it was a policy-based dismissal. In effect, the applicant unilaterally decided that since Metro Dublin was not initiated by government, it need not be acknowledged at all – a stance that is procedurally improper for an EIA. The result is that the MetroLink EIAR fails to inform ABP of potentially significant interactions: for example, the combined construction of two metro lines in the city, or the operational synergies of an integrated network. These factors could influence environmental outcomes (traffic patterns, air quality, etc.) and planning judgments (future-proofing infrastructure), yet they were never examined.
 - **"Not a Project" Rationalization:** We anticipate the applicant might argue that Metro Dublin is too uncertain or not "approved" and thus can be ignored. Such reasoning does not withstand scrutiny. Metro Dublin's status is analogous to many other projects typically considered in cumulative assessments – it is in pre-application, undergoing feasibility and consultation. The Board routinely considers the cumulative impact of projects at similar stages, especially when they are high-profile proposals known to the relevant authorities. Here, Metro Dublin was well known to NTA/TII (having been the subject of correspondence and meetings) and to the planning system (given the ABP pre-app). Dismissing it as "not an approved
-

project” reflects a **predetermination bias** rather than an objective filter. We note that even Metro Dublin All-Island Rail Review’s ideas were summarily excluded for not being policy, indicating a pattern: if a project or measure was outside the current government strategy, it was categorically ignored, no matter how plausible or beneficial. This approach is at odds with the Environmental Protection Agency’s guidelines, which urge considering projects that are “reasonably foreseeable” and not only those fully sanctioned. By any measure, Metro Dublin was reasonably foreseeable – it had an active corporate proponent, technical studies, and public visibility. The only reason it would be deemed “not foreseeable” is because the public authorities chose to **keep their eyes shut** to it.

- **Lack of Engagement or Refutation:** A further indicator of exclusion is that nowhere in the application or subsequent clarifications does the applicant engage with Metro Dublin’s substance – even if only to explain why they think it is inferior. If Metro Dublin truly lacked merit, one would expect NTA/TII to have analyzed it and provided reasoned arguments against it (e.g. cost, overlap, etc.) during the planning process. Instead, the strategy was to pretend it doesn’t exist. This silence speaks volumes. It suggests that the decision to exclude Metro Dublin was made **a priori**, not as the outcome of an objective analysis but as a matter of institutional convenience or protectionism. Consequently, the statutory process has been deprived of a fair comparison between the state’s preferred scheme and a credible alternative. ABP is left without the benefit of that comparative information, which is a serious procedural gap when assessing a project of MetroLink’s scale and impact.

In summary, the evidence shows a conscious effort to keep Metro Dublin “**off the books**” during MetroLink’s planning and Railway Order proceedings. This exclusion is not supported by any lawful criteria – Metro Dublin was neither too speculative (it had entered the formal planning queue) nor environmentally insignificant (it addresses the same travel market and thus has overlapping impacts and benefits). The exclusion stemmed from institutional bias (only projects in the NTA’s plan are recognized) rather than the **inclusive, objective assessment** that planning law demands.

2. Ignored Network-Level Benefits of Metro Dublin

By excluding Metro Dublin, the applicant and sponsoring agencies also ignored a host of network-level benefits that Metro Dublin offers – benefits which the people of Dublin are being denied without justification. We present key evidence from technical assessments and planning documents that demonstrate Metro Dublin’s superior or essential contributions to Dublin’s transport network, all of which have been glossed over in the MetroLink-focused process.

3.1 Congestion Relief and Mode Shift

Dublin City has transportation goals to significantly reduce private car traffic in the city centre, thereby improving air quality and the public realm. The Dublin City Centre Transport Plan, adopted by Dublin City Council, aims to remove 21,500 cars per day from the city core (relative to 2019 levels), noting that about 60% of cars entering the core are through-traffic with no local business. The Plan concludes that these vehicular trips must be shifted to public transport, walking, and cycling to achieve a liveable city. However, the capacity of the public transport network in all official plans (BusConnects, Luas expansions, DART+, and MetroLink) may not accommodate such a large mode shift. Even with those projects, there is a **gap** between policy aspirations and actual capacity.

Metro Dublin addresses this gap. A single metro line (MetroLink) alone cannot replace 21,500 car trips – international experience shows major cities have not achieved significant car reduction without a comprehensive metro **network**. Metro Dublin proposes additional high-capacity lines that, together with MetroLink, would enable the required mode shift. Evidence from the NTA’s regional transport model, as cited in the St. Stephen’s Green Traffic & Transportation Assessment, indicates that without Metro Dublin, public transport usage per capita in the region will be **below expectations**.

The **Greater Dublin Area Transport Strategy 2022 – 2042** suggests that public transport trips, based on the GDA number of public trips divided by the Dublin City Population*, indicate 349 public transport trips per capita, whereas a reasonable expectation would be 550, resulting in a shortfall of 57%.

(*Using Dublin City’s population as the divisor for GDA-wide public transport trips per capita provides a consistent and meaningful comparison over time. Since Dublin City is the core hub for public transport, most trips—whether local or commuter—are directly influenced by its infrastructure and accessibility. This metric helps track whether public transport use is growing relative to the city’s central role, independent of shifting commuter belt populations. A rising value indicates successful network expansion and reduced car dependency, while stagnation could signal inefficiencies or lack of integration. This approach aligns with global best practices in measuring urban transport effectiveness.)

TEN-T: Agreed Vision for European Transport Infrastructure. Ireland’s compliance with the EU’s TEN-T guidelines **requires** establishing a **direct national rail connection** to major **airports** handling over **12 million passengers annually by 2040**. While MetroLink enhances Dublin’s transport network, it does not achieve this requirement. In contrast, **Metro Dublin**

is designed to accommodate national rail services, positioning Ireland as a proactive member state while ensuring readiness for future shifts in travel demand.

Table 3.1(a): Annual Public Transport Trips Without and With Metro Dublin

Year	Dublin City Population	GDA Trips	Without Metro Dublin	With Metro Dublin
2019	1.17 million	282 million	240 per Capita	-
2042	1.41 million	492 million	349 per Capita	550 per Capita

Public transport trips per capita with and without Metro Dublin (2035).

The above projection underscores Metro Dublin's indispensable role in reducing congestion and car use. By offering **additional capacity and connectivity**, Metro Dublin attracts riders that would otherwise remain in cars, thereby directly facilitating the City Centre Transport Plan's goals. The plan's target of removing 21,500 cars is simply not credible without the extra throughput of a metro network. As our analysis of the Plan notes, BusConnects and MetroLink alone cannot absorb that many diverted car trips – the demand would overwhelm a single metro line and bus corridors and in addition both can't be used optionally by the public as they could be with Metro Dublin in place. Only Metro Dublin's full metro system provides enough high-capacity corridors and sufficient integration with other modes of transport including car to make such a mode shift feasible. In doing so, Metro Dublin also enhances conditions for walking and cycling: by removing some buses and cars from surface streets, it frees up road space for bike lanes and pedestrian areas, a synergy the City Centre Plan explicitly seeks (e.g. pedestrianizing College Green, etc.). Ignoring Metro Dublin means ignoring the only realistic path to achieve Dublin's climate and liveability targets. This omission in the planning process has policy consequences: it puts the success of the Climate Action Plan and the city's development plan objectives at risk, yet those consequences were not disclosed to ABP in the MetroLink application.

3.2 Capacity and Coverage Enhancements

Metro Dublin delivers critical capacity and coverage improvements that MetroLink by itself cannot provide. By design, MetroLink is a single north-south line (connecting Swords/Airport to the south city). It will certainly increase capacity along that corridor, but it leaves large swathes of the city and region unserved by metro-grade transit. Metro Dublin proposes additional lines/corridors – for example, an east-west axis or extensions serving areas beyond MetroLink's reach – thereby **expanding the coverage** of high-capacity rail. The complementary nature of the two projects was acknowledged in our previous submissions: MetroLink alone cannot handle the total projected growth in travel demand, whereas **"Metro Dublin enhances MetroLink's effectiveness by increasing network coverage."** Both projects together are essential to prevent worsening congestion and to maximize public transport accessibility across the city. Notably, the MetroLink Traffic &

Transportation Assessment confirms that even with MetroLink, many areas of the city center will see only modest increases in public transport mode share – a 2% increase in PT mode share regionally by 2035 with MetroLink, and barely 1% further by 2050. This incremental gain, while helpful, is not transformative. By contrast, a six-line metro (Metro Dublin) would create a **network effect**: multiplying capacity and offering alternate routes, which in turn attract far more ridership and yield a step-change in mode share. It is well established in transport planning that two lines do not just carry double the riders of one; a connected network carries many times more due to transfer possibilities and exponentially higher accessibility. Dublin currently has no true metro network – ignoring Metro Dublin means missing the opportunity to create one.

Furthermore, Metro Dublin's expanded coverage would directly support **housing development and regional connectivity** in ways MetroLink cannot on its own. For example, Metro Dublin's corridors are envisioned to serve major population centers and development zones not on the MetroLink alignment. This includes parts of west Dublin, the north-west and south suburbs, and perhaps interchange with radial rail lines – details that have been provided to ABP in Metro Dublin's initial briefs. The Planning Report submitted with Metro Dublin's pre-application highlighted how the project unlocks high-density housing along its corridors and integrates with land use plans. Independent projections show Metro Dublin could enable tens of thousands of additional homes and substantial employment growth by opening up new public transport catchments. These **network-wide benefits** were not factored into the MetroLink application, yet they are highly material to Dublin's proper planning and sustainable development. In effect, the State's single-line approach (MetroLink only) leaves significant demand unmet, and areas underserved, whereas Metro Dublin's network approach addresses those shortcomings. The failure to compare these outcomes is a lost opportunity in the planning evaluation. It also contravenes the requirement to plan in a **joined-up manner**. The NTA's own statutory objectives include promoting an integrated transport system – which logically means assessing how MetroLink and Metro Dublin together could form an integrated metro system for Dublin. Instead, integration was ignored in favor of a standalone project perspective.

From a capacity standpoint, the difference is stark. A full metro line can carry in the order of 20,000 – 30,000 passengers per direction per hour (depending on train length and frequency), far exceeding the capacity of even the best bus corridors or light rail lines. MetroLink will provide this capacity on one corridor; Metro Dublin would provide it on at least one or two additional corridors. This effectively **doubles or triples** the rapid transit capacity for Dublin. No combination of bus and tram projects can achieve the same result. The *Dublin City Centre Transport Plan* recognized that exclusive right-of-way systems (like a metro) are necessary for reliability and throughput in the congested core.

3.3 Value for Money and Delivery Efficiency

Metro Dublin's exclusion also meant that **innovative financing and delivery models** were not given any consideration. Metro Dublin is structured as a public-private partnership (PPP) and an **unsolicited infrastructure proposal** – one of the first of its kind in Ireland's transport sector. This approach could save the state significant capital expenditure, transfer certain risks to the private sector, and accelerate project delivery. A report titled *"Private Sector Participation in Light Rail/Light Metro Transit Initiatives"* underscores how unsolicited proposals and PPPs can be leveraged for projects like Metro Dublin. It notes that private investment can be attracted to viable, high-demand projects and that frameworks exist to evaluate and integrate such proposals. By bringing in private capital, Metro Dublin could proceed **without placing heavy demands on the public purse**, complementing exchequer-funded projects. In an era of constrained public finances and competing infrastructure needs, this is a significant advantage that should have been weighed by decision-makers. Instead, ignoring Metro Dublin meant ignoring a potential **€10+ billion** investment by the private sector into Irish public transport.

Metro Dublin's strategy, inspired by Madrid's efficient metro expansions under former CEO Professor Manuel Melis Maynar, has been meticulously planned and executed throughout the entire process. Metro Dublin seeks to outperform MetroLink in value. Utilizing Melis's strategies for cost-effective and rapid transit development, Metro Dublin has integrated these practices, potentially benefiting the MetroLink project as well. In 2018, Melis assured Transport Minister Shane Ross that Metro Dublin could replicate Madrid's success, a claim substantiated in 2015 when Melis's team demonstrated the feasibility of this model to the ABP Strategic Infrastructure Board.

Tables 3.2(a) & (b) benchmark the potential efficiencies in cost and timescale that both Metro Dublin and MetroLink could achieve, contrasting these with London's Elizabeth Line (Crossrail). The tables underscore MetroSur's swift and economical completion, featuring nearly double the tunnel length and over triple the number of stations compared to Crossrail, yet at a cost that was 95.6% less per kilometre.

MetroSur, initiated in September 1999, was completed in a mere 34.8 months, covering 40.5 km with 28 underground stations for €1,600 million, translating to €46 million per kilometre. In stark contrast, Crossrail, which started five months earlier in April 1999, spanned 22.8 km with 9 underground stations and took 288 months to complete, costing a total of €22,450 million, or €1,030 million per kilometre. This stark disparity highlights Madrid's more efficient and cost-effective metro construction approach.

The table below illustrates the comparative metrics between Madrid's MetroSur and London's Crossrail, highlighting significant differences in efficiency and cost:

Table 3.2(a): Comparison of London's Crossrail and Madrid's MetroSur

Metric	Madrid MetroSur	London Crossrail	?: Madrid/London
Contract Start	Sep. 1999	Apr. 1999	--
Start to Commissioning	34.8 mts	288 mts	12%
Project Length (all in tunnels)	40.5 km	22.8 km	178%
Stations (all underground)	28	9	311%
All inclusive cost	€ 1,857 m	€ 22,450 m	8.3%
Cost per kilometre	€ 46 m	€ 1,030 m	4.4%

Additionally, Madrid's Line 7, which began construction in August 1996 and was commissioned in 28.7 months, highlights similar efficiency, underscoring the broader applicability of Madrid's metro construction model.

Table 3.2(b): Comparison of London's Crossrail and Madrid's Line 7

Metric	Madrid Line 7	London Crossrail	?: Madrid/London
Contract Start	Aug. 1996	Apr. 1999	-
Time to Commissioning	28.7 mts	288 mts	12%
Project Length (all in tunnels)	11.7 km	22.8 km	178%
Stations (all underground)	13	9	311%
All inclusive cost	€ 424 m	€ 22,450 m	1.9%
Cost per kilometre	€ 38.5 m	€ 1,030 m	3.7%

Incorporating the complexities of Madrid's Line 7 into a comparison with London's Crossrail underscores the engineering and operational challenges associated with the Spanish project. Line 7 is noteworthy because it intersects with over seven metro lines and one Renfe line—the latter being one of the most heavily trafficked rail lines in Spain at the time. This Renfe line saw 485 trains per day, including 38 long-distance services, and the clearance between the tunnels was less than 2 meters.

This tight clearance and the high volume of intersecting train traffic presented significant engineering challenges, particularly in maintaining safety standards and minimizing disruptions during construction. Such complexities make Line 7 a compelling point of

comparison to Crossrail, which also navigated complex urban environments and required sophisticated engineering solutions to manage its interactions with existing infrastructure. However, the precise nature of these complexities in Line 7 highlights the adept handling of a densely intersected and extremely busy urban rail network, potentially offering insights into cost-efficiency and rapid construction methodologies that could be contrasted against Crossrail's approach and expenditures.

To adjust Madrid Line 7's 1999 costs to 2025 Dublin conditions, a multiplier of approximately 3.0 is applied. This reflects inflation (~1.75x) and Dublin's higher construction costs (~1.7x) due to more expensive labour, materials, and lower metro-building efficiency. In effect, €100 million spent on Madrid's metro in 1999 equates to around €300 million in 2025 Dublin prices, providing a realistic cost benchmark for comparison.

Using the 3.0 cost escalation factor, Madrid Line 7's 1999 cost of €424 million adjusts to approximately €1.27 billion in 2025 Dublin prices. Comparing this to London's Crossrail, which cost €22.45 billion, Madrid's project remains vastly more cost-efficient.

Despite taking only 28.7 months to complete—just 12% of Crossrail's 288-month timeline—Madrid Line 7 delivered 11.7 km of tunnels and 13 underground stations, achieving 178% of Crossrail's tunnel length per year of construction. The cost per kilometre in adjusted Dublin prices is €109 million, still just 10.6% of Crossrail's staggering €1.03 billion per km.

This reinforces how Madrid's metro-building efficiency, even when adjusted for Dublin's higher costs, significantly outperforms the delivery model used for Crossrail.

The inclusion of comprehensive cost and time analyses, along with the active engagement of the National Transport Authority (NTA) and Transport Infrastructure Ireland (TII) in the Metro Dublin project, aligns with the requirements outlined by An Bord Pleanála (ABP) for large-scale infrastructure projects. ABP's guidelines emphasise the necessity for detailed project planning that addresses key performance targets related to time, cost, scope, and quality. Specifically, the NTA's Project Approval Guidelines mandate the development of a Project Plan that articulates how and when these targets are to be achieved, ensuring that projects meet the expected standards and deliver value for public investment.

Furthermore, TII's Project Management Guidelines specify that approval points within a project's lifecycle serve as critical decision junctures. At these stages, the level of certainty regarding cost, quality, and time must be thoroughly assessed to determine whether a project should proceed, be revised, or halted. This structured approach ensures that all potential risks are evaluated, and that the project remains aligned with its objectives and budgetary constraints.

By incorporating detailed cost and time analyses and engaging proactively with the NTA and TII, the Metro Dublin project demonstrates adherence to these established guidelines. This compliance not only facilitates a transparent and accountable planning process but also ensures that the project is positioned to deliver its intended benefits effectively and efficiently.

Furthermore, TII's Project Management Guidelines specify that approval points within a project's lifecycle serve as critical decision junctures. At these stages, the level of certainty regarding cost, quality, and time must be thoroughly assessed to determine whether a project should proceed, be revised, or halted. This structured approach ensures that all potential risks are evaluated, and that the project remains aligned with its objectives and budgetary constraints.

These comparisons effectively position Metro Dublin and potentially MetroLink to leverage Madrid's proven, efficient metro delivery techniques, promising substantial cost savings and quicker completion times relative to traditional methods as demonstrated by London's Crossrail. Ireland is presently suffering from **one of the highest per-kilometre metro construction costs in Europe** – a situation evident in MetroLink's escalating budget. By applying the Madrid model to Dublin (standardized designs, efficient procurement, avoiding over-engineering), Metro Dublin promises significantly lower unit costs. None of this was debated in the planning process because Metro Dublin was not brought to the table. This represents a serious omission in evaluating the public interest. ABP, as the arbiter of the Railway Order, should be concerned with whether the chosen scheme is not just functionally adequate but also cost-effective and timely. The exclusion of Metro Dublin kept ABP from hearing evidence that a **cheaper and faster delivery** might be achievable. For example, the private consortium behind Metro Dublin could potentially deliver the project on a fixed-price basis, insulating taxpayers from overruns – a stark contrast to traditional public projects that often run over budget. A real-world case in point is Vancouver's Canada Line (a metro to the airport delivered via PPP) which opened on time and within budget, leveraging private expertise. The Irish authorities' refusal to even consider such models (despite their own policy encouragement of PPPs in other sectors) hints at protectionism rather than prudent analysis.

By sidelining Metro Dublin, the process also ignored Ireland's **obligation to foster competition and innovation** in infrastructure provision. The Department of Transport and NTA have nominally welcomed private sector participation in principle, yet in practice when Metro Dublin came forward, the door was shut. This could be seen as a breach of the government's duty to obtain best value and to **avoid anti-competitive practices**. The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission would recognize that excluding a ready and able bidder (Metro Dublin's team) from even presenting an alternative is not how a healthy market operates. The *Private Sector Participation* report and similar frameworks recommend transparent mechanisms to consider unsolicited proposals so that they can be evaluated on merit. That would involve a comparative assessment of Metro Dublin against MetroLink on cost-benefit grounds. Had such an assessment been done, it might have revealed that Metro Dublin offers equal or greater benefits at lower net public cost – a result highly pertinent to the public interest. Unfortunately, no such assessment was carried out within the Railway Order consideration. This omission is to the detriment of taxpayers and riders alike.

In sum, Metro Dublin's inclusion would inject competition, funding, and efficiency into Dublin's transport investment. These advantages were ignored, yet they form a compelling

part of Metro Dublin's case that must now be made directly to ABP through this submission. We maintain that the Board cannot fully evaluate MetroLink's application without understanding **what is being given up** by excluding Metro Dublin. The superior network performance, the potential cost savings, and accelerated delivery are all factors that could materially affect a planning balance or conditions imposed.

3. Breaches of Specific Legal Provisions and Policy Obligations

Given the analysis above, we highlight the key legal breaches and omissions that arise from Metro Dublin's exclusion:

- **Breach of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (as amended) – EIA Requirements:** Failure to consider Metro Dublin as a reasonable alternative and as a relevant project in cumulative impact assessment contravenes the EIA Directive's requirements (Article 5(1)(d) and Annex IV) as implemented in Irish law. The Board, as the EIA competent authority, is obligated to ensure the developer has adequately described alternatives and cumulative effects. In this case, the omission of any reference to Metro Dublin means the EIAR is **incomplete** and potentially flawed under the law. Granting permission or a Railway Order on the basis of an incomplete EIA would be unsafe and open to legal challenge. It is a fundamental principle that all likely significant effects and alternatives be examined; Metro Dublin's scenario qualifies on both counts and its exclusion is a breach of that principle.
- **Breach of the Transport (Railway Infrastructure) Act 2001 and Transport Authority Acts:** These acts collectively envisage a **plurality of actors** contributing to transport infrastructure. Section 11 of the 2001 Act (as amended) empowers the making of Railway Orders for railway works in the public interest. It does not limit such applications to a single entity or project. By refusing to engage with Metro Dublin's intended Railway Order application (and in effect trying to lock up corridors via MetroLink's order and "protection zones"), TII and the Department have subverted the intent of the Act. The spirit of the legislation is being violated by creating a de facto exclusive franchise for MetroLink. Additionally, the NTA's disregard of Metro Dublin violates Section 12 of the 2008 Act, which requires the Transport Strategy to be reviewed and updated as necessary – new proposals like Metro Dublin should be assessed, not ignored. The NTA also has a statutory duty to **coordinate transport and land use**; ignoring a project that could unlock housing and economic development means the NTA did not fully discharge this duty in its strategy or advice to Government. In short, the exclusion amounts to an **ultra vires** act – going beyond the legal powers – by preventing due consideration of a lawful project.
- **Violation of Ireland's Competition Law and EU Competition Rules:** The coordinated exclusion of Metro Dublin by state bodies can be viewed as an anti-competitive arrangement contrary to the Competition Act 2002 and Articles 101-102 TFEU. While those provisions typically address undertakings and markets, it is notable that the State is here acting in a commercial capacity (developing a metro) and actively preventing a potential competitor from entering. Article 106 TFEU prohibits Member States from reinforcing monopolistic conduct in public enterprises in a manner contrary to the competition rules. By only promoting the state's own metro and refusing access to the market for a private investor, the authorities are arguably infringing these principles. The EU Railway Liberalisation measures (the First to Fourth Railway Packages) were aimed at precisely this issue – to **open up rail projects and services to competition**. Ireland has transposed these directives, and

thus must allow private railway initiatives to be considered on fair terms. The **European Commission could deem the exclusion of Metro Dublin as a market distortion**, especially since Metro Dublin sought no exclusive subsidy or guarantee, only a fair shot at authorization. Indeed, as we cited earlier, EU law explicitly protects the rights of private rail developers to seek approval. The Board should be cognizant of not enabling a breach of these higher-level laws. Ensuring competition is not just a commercial matter but a legal one in this context.

- **Non-Compliance with Government Policy on Private Investment:** Government policy (through various infrastructure plans and the Public-Private Partnership framework) encourages leveraging private investment for public infrastructure where appropriate. The Department of Public Expenditure and Reform's guidelines on **Unsolicited Proposals** (2021) set out a process for evaluating such proposals to ensure transparency and value for money. Metro Dublin followed the spirit of these policies by coming forward with a fully developed unsolicited proposal for a metro. However, the treating of Metro Dublin by relevant agencies fell short of the expected standards in those guidelines – there was no genuine assessment or engagement. By failing to follow their own policy framework for PPPs and private sector participation, the authorities have not only missed an opportunity but have also undermined confidence in Ireland's infrastructure investment climate. This has legal implications insofar as the decision-making deviated from stated public policy without rationale, which can be grounds for the Board to question the robustness of the planning decision-making process.
- **Contravention of Principles of Natural Justice and Fair Procedures in Administrative Decision-Making:** Although Metro Dublin is not yet a formal party to the MetroLink case, the broader handling of the project raises fairness issues. As a matter of administrative law, public authorities are expected to act fairly and not arbitrarily. Here, the exclusion of Metro Dublin was done without transparent criteria, without giving the promoters a chance to present their case in the relevant forums, and without objective analysis. Such an approach can be deemed arbitrary and unreasonable, failing the **test of reasonableness** in administrative actions (the State Bodies must act neither irrationally nor in a biased manner). The Board, being a public body itself, has a duty to ensure its decisions are based on complete and fair information. Where a likely alternative is ignored due to bias, the Board's eventual decision could be tainted. We submit that the Board should recognize this and seek to correct it by insisting on a fuller evaluation that includes Metro Dublin.

4. Need for Corrective Action by An Bord Pleanála

Given the points above, we respectfully submit that An Bord Pleanála is now under a **legal obligation to rectify** the situation. The Board has both the powers and the duty to ensure that the Railway Order process for MetroLink fully complies with planning law and EU law. We urge the Board to take the following actions to remedy the unlawful exclusion of Metro Dublin:

- **Require Re-Assessment of Alternatives:** The Board should request that the applicant (TII/NTA) prepare a supplemental report reassessing alternatives in light of Metro Dublin's proposals and the evidence provided. This could be done under the Board's power to seek Further Information. Specifically, the applicant should analyze Metro Dublin as a scenario – including its environmental, social, and economic implications – compared to the chosen MetroLink scheme. Such an analysis would fill the gap in the EIAR and allow the Board to make an informed decision. It is not too late in the process to do this; indeed, it is essential to avoid a flawed consent. If the applicant is unwilling, the Board could commission an independent assessment. The key is that **Metro Dublin must be formally considered as an alternative** at this stage, and the reasons for ultimately selecting or not selecting it should be transparently stated, as required by law.
 - **Include Metro Dublin in the Formal Consideration of the Case:** Metro Dublin should be explicitly acknowledged in the Board's Inspector's Report and decision as a considered alternative. Even if the Railway Order sought is for MetroLink, the Board's record should show that it weighed Metro Dublin in its deliberations. We ask the Board to make **Metro Dublin a material consideration**. This could involve holding an additional module of the oral hearing (if reopened) to hear submissions on Metro Dublin or inviting Metro Dublin's promoters to submit evidence directly. By doing so, ABP would ensure that the final decision on MetroLink addresses the Metro Dublin option, closing the current procedural lacuna. It will also signal to all parties that ABP expects comprehensive alternative assessments for major projects, including those originating outside state agencies.
 - **Facilitate Metro Dublin's Railway Order Process in Parallel:** The Board can and should facilitate the full legal engagement of Metro Dublin in the statutory process going forward. This means that if Metro Dublin's promoters submit a Railway Order application for their project, it should be allowed to proceed without prejudice or obstruction from overlapping issues with MetroLink. In practical terms, we request that ABP, in any approval it may grant to MetroLink, **insert conditions or notes that do not preclude Metro Dublin's development**. For instance, any protective provisions (so-called "MetroLink exclusion zones" for future works) in the order should be crafted so as not to unreasonably prevent a future intersecting or connecting metro line. Additionally, ABP should communicate with TII and the Department of Transport that Metro Dublin's proposal warrants coordination rather than opposition. The Board could recommend that the Minister for Transport and NTA actively engage with Metro Dublin under Section 121 of the 2008 Act (which allows the Minister to direct the NTA in matters of policy implementation). This would ensure a joined-up approach. Essentially, ABP's stance should be that **both MetroLink and Metro Dublin can and should be pursued** in a complementary fashion for the overall benefit of Dublin – a position that is supported by evidence and one that upholds the objectives of national transport policy.
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- **Ensure Compliance with Competition and Procurement Principles:** We also encourage ABP to consult with the Competition Authority or European Commission if needed, to verify that approving MetroLink without considering Metro Dublin does not inadvertently endorse an anti-competitive outcome. By actively incorporating Metro Dublin into the process, ABP will demonstrate compliance with the EU market access principles highlighted earlier. This protective step could shield the eventual decision from legal challenges on competition grounds, as ABP will have shown that it did not rubber-stamp an exclusionary tactic but rather insisted on fair evaluation.

In conclusion, Metro Dublin's exclusion to date has been improper and unsustainable. The Board now has the opportunity – and the duty – to correct this course. By doing so, ABP will not only uphold the law and procedural fairness, but also ensure that Dublin's public transport infrastructure is planned in the most effective, integrated manner possible. The evidence is clear that Metro Dublin can greatly enhance network capacity, alleviate congestion, improve value for money, and accelerate delivery of needed services. These benefits should be harnessed, not ignored.

5. Conclusion

We urge An Bord Pleanála to take a proactive stance in rectifying the unlawful exclusion of Metro Dublin. The Board's mission is to facilitate proper planning and sustainable development. In the context of the MetroLink project, "proper planning" cannot occur in a vacuum that shuts out a critical alternative. The Board is empowered to look at the bigger picture – and the bigger picture here is that Dublin needs a metro network, not just a single line, and that Metro Dublin's proposal is a credible means to achieve that. Legally, ethically, and practically, Metro Dublin deserves to be fully heard in this process. We respectfully submit that the Board should exercise its authority to reopen and broaden the assessment, demand inclusion of Metro Dublin in the analysis, and guide the parties toward a cooperative framework where MetroLink and Metro Dublin are both advanced through their respective statutory processes. This is the only outcome consistent with the requirements of Irish planning law, the Transport Acts, and Ireland's obligations under EU law.

By insisting on these measures, An Bord Pleanála will help ensure that Dublin's future transport infrastructure is decided on merit and facts, not on omissions. It will protect the integrity of the planning system and public trust in the fairness of major infrastructure decisions. Finally, it will position Ireland to harness all available resources – public and private – in delivering a world-class transport network for its capital city. We thank the Board for its consideration of this submission. We are prepared to assist further in any way necessary, including providing technical evidence or participating in additional hearings or consultations as the Board sees fit.

6. Requested Outcome

For the reasons outlined above, **we request that An Bord Pleanála defer any final decision on the MetroLink Railway Order until the issues raised herein are adequately addressed.** Specifically, we urge that the applicant and/or Transport Infrastructure Ireland (TII) be directed to: (a) Re-assess project modifications with allowances for Metro Dublin and submit the findings for ABP review. (b) Update the cumulative impact assessment to include the likely development impacts of Metro Dublin. (c) Confirm measures to accommodate Metro Dublin's integration into the existing network.

Furthermore, **we request that An Bord Pleanála explicitly acknowledge Metro Dublin** as a viable alternative in its decision documents. Through these actions, the Board will uphold the law and ensure a more robust, future-proof planning outcome.

Metro Dublin expects that the Board will consider these concerns, which are based on evidence, policy, and law. Metro Dublin is prepared to engage formally with the statutory process and contribute to Dublin's transport solutions. **We request that An Bord Pleanála ask** the Department of Transport, National Transport Authority, Transport Infrastructure Ireland, the Greater Dublin Area Local City and County Councils, and Córas Iompair Éireann to engage with Metro Dublin to facilitate discussions.

The public interest demands nothing less.
